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Tort Lite? — Vancouver (City) v. Ward 
and the Availability of Damages for 
Charter Infringements  
Robert E. Charney and Josh Hunter* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Tort cases are all about damages. Historically at least, constitutional 
cases have been about declarations, not damages. This is not to say that 
vast sums of money have not been at stake in constitutional cases. 
Constitutional cases relating to the validity of fees and taxes have put in 
issue millions and potentially billions of dollars.1 Similarly, Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 section 15 cases seeking the expansion 
of government funded benefit programs such as education,3 health care,4 
and social assistance5 usually involve many millions of dollars of annual 
government funding.  
Governments have, since the abolition of Crown immunity from tort 
by the Proceedings Against the Crown Acts,6 been subject to damages for 
                                                                                                             
*  General Counsel and Counsel, respectively, Constitutional Law Branch, Ministry of the 
Attorney General of Ontario. The authors were counsel for the Attorney General of Ontario in 
Vancouver v. Ward in the Supreme Court of Canada. The views expressed herein are solely those of 
the authors and do not represent the position of the Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario. The 
authors would like to thank Jessica Eisen and Rochelle Fox for their contributions to the legal 
analysis advanced in this paper. This paper was originally presented at the Osgoode Professional 
Development 7th Annual Conference on Crown Liability, February 18, 2011. 
1  Re Eurig Estate, [1998] S.C.J. No. 72, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 565 (S.C.C.); Kingstreet Invest-
ments Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Finance), [2007] S.C.J. No. 1, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2007 SCC 1 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Eurig”]. 
2  Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
3  Adler v. Ontario, [1996] S.C.J. No. 110, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 (S.C.C.). 
4  Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 
71, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657, 2004 SCC 78 (S.C.C.). 
5  Masse v. Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services), [1996] O.J. No. 363, 134 
D.L.R. (4th) 20 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Gosselin v. Québec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 
4 S.C.R. 429, 2002 SCC 84 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gosselin v. Quebec”]. 
6  These Acts which have been passed by all of the common law Canadian jurisdictions are 
modelled on the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947 (U.K.), 10 & 11 Geo. VI, c. 44. In Ontario, Crown 
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torts committed by their servants and agents. Thus, the ability of courts 
to order the government to pay damages was hardly a new issue when 
the question of Charter damages finally reached the Supreme Court of 
Canada in the case of Vancouver (City) v. Ward.7 Indeed, it was already 
common practice for plaintiffs suing governments for the alleged tortious 
conduct of their servants and agents to plead that the conduct complained 
of was both a common-law tort and a violation of the Charter and to 
claim damages on both grounds. The fact that tort law and section 7 of 
the Charter are both designed to protect “life, liberty, and security of the 
person” meant that much tortious conduct committed by government 
officials would also constitute an infringement of the Charter.8 In most 
such cases, the ability to prove the tort claim rendered the Charter claim 
redundant; the corollary was that the inability to prove the tort claim 
meant that the Charter claim would also fail.  
There never has been any doubt that section 24(1) of the Charter au-
thorizes the courts to order the government to pay damages in cases in 
which damages are an “appropriate and just” remedy.9 The real question 
has always been whether damages might be a just and appropriate 
remedy for a Charter violation even if the conduct complained of does 
not also qualify as a tort.  
Mr. Ward alleged that his Charter rights were infringed by the police 
unlawfully detaining and arresting him and seizing his property and by 
provincial correctional officers unlawfully strip searching him and 
imprisoning him. These are all claims which, if pursued as the compara-
ble torts of false arrest, false imprisonment, assault, battery and conver-
sion, would require proof of the appropriate level of fault for each tort. 
The issue in the Ward case was whether the same level of fault should 
have been required when they were pursued as alleged breaches of the 
Charter.  
                                                                                                             
immunity for torts committed by Crown servants and agents was abolished as of September 1, 1963 
by the Proceedings Against the Crown Act, 1962-63, S.O. 1962-63, c. 109, now the Proceedings 
Against the Crown Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27. Before the passing of these Acts, the Crown could only 
be sued in tort with its consent, obtained through a petition of right. See Peter W. Hogg & Patrick J. 
Monahan, Liability of the Crown, 3d ed. (Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 2000), at 108-14 [hereinafter 
“Hogg & Monahan”]. 
7  [2010] S.C.J. No. 27, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28, 2010 SCC 27 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ward 
(S.C.C.)”]. 
8  Nelles v. Ontario, [1989] S.C.J. No. 86, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170 (S.C.C.); Miazga v. Kvello 
Estate, [2009] S.C.J. No. 51, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 339, 2009 SCC 51 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Miazga”]. 
9  Schachter v. Canada, [1992] S.C.J. No. 68, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, at 725 (S.C.C.) [here- 
inafter “Schachter”]. 
(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)  TORT LITE? 395 
 
Ward was the first case in the Supreme Court of Canada where the 
lower courts had dismissed the tort claim but allowed damages under the 
Charter, thus transforming Charter damages into a “consolation prize” for 
plaintiffs whose claims, as a result of the law, the evidence or the 
pleadings, did not meet the applicable tort law standard. While the 
unanimous decision of the Supreme Court appears to uphold this ap-
proach, we believe that a closer reading of the decision indicates that the 
Court did not stray very far from basic tort law principles. The lower 
court decisions appear to adopt a “strict liability” approach to certain 
Charter claims, but the Supreme Court’s reasons indicate that something 
more than mere causation will have to be proven before Charter damages 
will be considered “appropriate and just”.  
II. THE EVENTS OF AUGUST 1, 2002 THAT LED TO MR. WARD 
SUING VANCOUVER AND BRITISH COLUMBIA 
On August 16, 2000, a protester in Charlottetown threw a pie in the 
face of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien.10 Two years later, police officers 
responsible for ensuring the Prime Minister’s safety as he opened the 
Millennium Gate in Vancouver’s Chinatown received reports that another 
attempt would be made to “pie” the Prime Minister during the ceremony.11 
A. Cameron Ward is a well-known Vancouver lawyer who, according 
to his biography on his firm’s website, “has a particular interest in social 
justice issues and has represented a number of activists who have 
become involved in legal proceedings”.12 Mr. Ward decided to attend the 
Millennium Gate opening ceremony. He parked his car near the cere-
mony, listened to the beginning of the Prime Minister’s speech, and then 
began to head south on nearby Taylor Street.13 
Shortly before he did so, a Vancouver police officer assigned to liaise 
with the R.C.M.P. announced over the police radio that a white male had 
been overheard planning to throw a pie at the Prime Minister. A descrip-
tion was given that, although it did contain certain elements similar to 
Mr. Ward’s appearance, generally did not match his appearance. A 
                                                                                                             
10  Online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/story/2000/08/16/peiChretienPie16aug00.html.>  
11  Ward v. Vancouver (City), [2007] B.C.J. No. 9, 63 B.C.L.R. (4th) 361, 2007 BCSC 3, at 
para. 1 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Ward (B.C.S.C.)”]. 
12  Online: <http://www.cameronward.com/biographies/.>  
13  Ward (B.C.S.C.), supra, note 11, at para. 5. 
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second broadcast from an unidentified officer followed stating that a 
male matching the description was running southward on Taylor Street. 
Mr. Ward was arrested on Taylor Street a few minutes after this broadcast 
was made but his and the officers’ versions of what occurred before his 
arrest differ significantly.14 
Mr. Ward testified that he was heading down Taylor Street to gain a 
better vantage point of a protester holding a sign behind the Prime 
Minister because he wanted to see how the man would be treated by 
police. He was stopped by a police officer who asked him for identifica-
tion but told the officer that he did not have to provide any identification. 
After the officer called for back-up, several more officers arrived and 
handcuffed him. The officers would not tell him whether he was under 
arrest or allow him to call a lawyer using his cell phone despite his 
repeated requests to do so. He denies ever raising his voice until after he 
was arrested.15 
The officers testified that Mr. Ward was stopped because he was run-
ning down Tyson Street like the man described in the second broadcast. 
When stopped, he started screaming hysterically and spitting at the officers 
as they tried to investigate whether he had been involved in a “pieing” 
attempt. A crowd, including media representatives, had gathered and Mr. 
Ward directed his yelling at them. Mr. Ward was handcuffed because the 
arresting officer was concerned he would escape or assault the officer. Mr. 
Ward was escorted to a nearby “paddy wagon” and transported to jail.16 
The police had Mr. Ward’s car towed to a police compound for the purpose 
of searching it once a warrant had been obtained but later decided they did 
not have grounds to obtain a warrant.17 
The jail was a jointly run facility staffed by provincial correctional 
officers and one city police officer. When Mr. Ward first arrived at the 
jail, he was put in a holding cell. A few minutes later, he was taken to a 
room by two correctional officers who told him to remove his clothes in 
accordance with the jail’s policy that all new entrants would be strip 
searched with the exception of by-law offenders and drunken persons. 
Mr. Ward removed all of his clothes except for his underwear. When he 
objected to removing them, he was not forced to do so. Mr. Ward was 
then placed in a small cell by himself where he stayed for the next 
                                                                                                             
14  Id., at paras. 5-6. 
15  Id., at paras. 7-10. 
16  Id., at paras. 11-23. 
17  Id. at para. 31. 
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several hours, except for when he was allowed to call his lawyers.18 
Approximately four-and-a-half hours after Mr. Ward was arrested (and 
several hours after the Prime Minister had left), Mr. Ward was released 
without charge.19 
III. HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS 
Mr. Ward publicly demanded an apology from the Vancouver Police 
Department and lodged a complaint with the Police Complaint Commis-
sioner. His complaint was dismissed and he never received an apology.20 
Mr. Ward therefore brought an action against the City of Vancouver 
(which was vicariously liable for the actions of the Vancouver police 
officers) and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of British Columbia (who 
was vicariously liable for the actions of the provincial correctional 
officers). He sought damages for assault, battery, false imprisonment, 
negligence and breaches of his sections 7, 8 and 9 Charter rights.21 
1.  The Trial Decision 
Justice Tysoe, as he then was, found that Mr. Ward had been running 
down Tyler Street when the officers stopped him and did start yelling and 
creating a disturbance. He found that the officers arrested Mr. Ward for 
breach of the peace, but not for assault or attempted assault. He was only 
under investigation for those possible offences.22 
Justice Tysoe found that the police had reasonable grounds to detain 
Mr. Ward for investigative purposes. The initial detention was therefore 
lawful and not a breach of Mr. Ward’s section 9 rights.23 Similarly, the 
handcuffing of Mr. Ward was not an assault or battery as the officer had 
reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Ward might escape or assault 
him.24 He went on to find that the police had reasonable and probable 
grounds to arrest Mr. Ward without a warrant for breach of the peace 
                                                                                                             
18  Id. at paras. 24-30. 
19  Id., at para. 32. 
20  Id., at para. 34. 
21  Id., at para. 3. 
22  Id., at paras. 37-46. 
23  Id., at paras. 52-56. 
24  Id., at para. 56. 
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because he was creating a disturbance in a public place.25 They would 
not, however, have had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him for 
assault or attempted assault.26 Nevertheless, as the arrest was a lawful 
arrest for breach of the peace, the arrest and transfer to the jail was not an 
assault, a battery, or a breach of Mr. Ward’s section 9 rights.27 
The police were not, however, entitled to continue detaining Mr. 
Ward for a breach of the peace after the Prime Minister had left the 
vicinity. As they had no other grounds to continue detaining him, Tysoe 
J. found that he had been falsely imprisoned for three and a half to four 
hours which was also a breach of his section 9 Charter rights.28 
The trial judge concluded that it was unreasonable to strip search all 
new entrants (except by-law offenders and drunken individuals) as a 
matter of course even if, like Mr. Ward, no decision had been made to 
charge them and they were not going to mix with the general prison 
population. He determined that Mr. Ward’s strip search was not con-
ducted in accordance with the written provincial policy governing strip 
searches (or if it was, that the policy itself was unreasonable) and 
therefore breached Mr. Ward’s section 8 Charter rights.29 
Justice Tysoe dismissed a claim that the police officer in charge of 
the jail assaulted Mr. Ward by threatening him and claims that he was 
assaulted or battered during the strip search.30 Mr. Ward did not plead 
assault or battery by the provincial correctional officers.31 The trial judge 
also dismissed claims of negligence against the police and provincial 
correctional officers on the basis that any duty owed by the city or the 
province was a duty owed to the public at large and not a private law 
duty owed to Mr. Ward which could give rise to damages. As well, no 
evidence was presented on the applicable standard of care.32  
The trial judge did find, however, that the seizure of Mr. Ward’s ve-
hicle constituted a breach of his section 8 Charter rights as there was no 
reason to seize his car in connection with an arrest for breach of the 
                                                                                                             
25  Id., at paras. 57-58. 
26  Id., at paras. 59-65. 
27  Id., at para. 65. 
28  Id., at paras. 66-71. 
29  Id., at paras. 72-86. 
30  Id., at paras. 87-90. 
31  Ward v. Vancouver (City), [2009] B.C.J. No. 91, 89 B.C.L.R. (4th) 217, 2009 BCCA 23, 
at paras. 40-45 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Ward (B.C.C.A.)”], per Low J.A. 
32  Ward (B.C.S.C.), supra, note 11, at paras. 94-96. 
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peace.33 Although Mr. Ward had also pleaded that the seizure of the car 
constituted the tort of conversion, Tysoe J. did not address this issue in 
his reasons.34 
Justice Tysoe concluded that damages were an appropriate and just 
remedy for the section 8 breaches caused by the strip search and the 
seizure of the car in addition to a declaration that Mr. Ward’s rights had 
been breached.35 He awarded $5,000 in general damages for false 
imprisonment (to avoid double recovery, no damages were awarded for 
the section 9 breach caused by the same facts), $5,000 for the section 8 
breach caused by the strip search, and $100 for the section 8 breach 
caused by the seizure of Mr. Ward’s car. He declined to award aggra-
vated, exemplary or punitive damages.36 
2.  The Court of Appeal 
Mr. Ward appealed the dismissal of his claim that the arrest by city 
police was unlawful and the quantum of the damages awarded for false 
imprisonment. The City of Vancouver cross-appealed, arguing that 
damages should not have been awarded for the seizure of Mr. Ward’s car. 
The province brought a separate appeal arguing that damages were not an 
appropriate remedy for the breach of Mr. Ward’s section 8 Charter rights 
caused by the strip search in the absence of any showing of fault on the 
part of the correctional officers. Mr. Ward cross-appealed seeking greater 
damages including punitive damages.37 
The majority of the Court of Appeal (Low J.A., with Finch C.J.B.C. 
concurring) agreed with Tysoe J. that the police had reasonable and 
probable grounds to initially stop Mr. Ward and detain him briefly while 
they investigated him. Mr. Ward did not dispute that his subsequent 
behaviour constituted a breach of the peace. The majority therefore 
upheld Tysoe J.’s finding that the arrest for breach of the peace was 
lawful. It also found no error in Tysoe J.’s determination of the appropri-
ate level of damages.38 
                                                                                                             
33  Id., at paras. 91-93. 
34  Ward (B.C.C.A.), supra, note 31, at paras. 33, per Low J.A., and 96, per Saunders J.A. 
35  Ward (B.C.S.C.), supra, note 11, at paras. 105-113. 
36  Id., at paras. 114-129. 
37  Ward (B.C.C.A.), supra, note 31, at paras. 5-8. 
38  Id., at paras. 13-27 and 67-70. 
400 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
Turning to the awards of Charter damages, the majority held that, as 
no challenge had been made to the validity of any legislation, the 
principle set out in Mackin that a section 24(1) remedy such as damages 
cannot be combined with a declaration of invalidity under section 52 
unless there is bad faith or an abuse of power did not apply.39 Nor  
was the government policy as a whole challenged as was the case in 
Wynberg.40 Rather, the Charter breach was caused by the conduct of the 
correctional officers who had unreasonably interpreted the provincial 
strip search policy as requiring a search of persons like Mr. Ward who 
had not been charged with any offence and would not be placed in the 
general prison population.41 The majority found that section 24(1) vested 
the Court with a broad remedial jurisdiction to grant “such remedy as the 
court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances” whether or not 
accompanied by a tort or bad faith.42 It therefore refused to interfere with 
Tysoe J.’s determination that damages were appropriate on the facts of 
the case or the quantum of damages he awarded.43 
Justice Saunders in dissent agreed that Mr. Ward’s appeal and cross-
appeal should be dismissed but disagreed that Charter damages should 
have been awarded in the absence of wilful malice or bad faith.44 He held 
that if the policy itself had been unreasonable, the principle in Mackin 
would have applied and damages should not have been awarded absent a 
showing of bad faith or abuse of power.45 If the search was not conducted 
in accordance with the policy, then the question was whether state action 
that is not a tort or performed in bad faith should give rise to damages. 
Justice Saunders held that, absent a tort, there needed to be something 
more, such as a degree of deliberation, wilful blindness or bad faith, 
before Charter damages could be awarded. Otherwise, there would be 
strict liability for damages for a Charter breach.46 As Tysoe J. had 
dismissed the negligence claim against the province and had found that 
                                                                                                             
39  Id., at paras. 46-58; Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance), [2002] S.C.J. No. 
13, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 405, 2002 SCC 13 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mackin”]. 
40  Ward (B.C.C.A.), id., at para. 59; Wynberg v. Ontario, [2006] O.J. No. 2732, 82 O.R. 
(3d) 561 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 441 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Wynberg”]. 
41  Ward (B.C.C.A.), id., at paras. 62-63. 
42  Id., at para. 64. 
43  Id., at paras. 64-65. 
44  Id., at para. 72. 
45  Id., at para. 81. 
46  Id., at paras. 82-90. 
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the correctional officers “were not malicious, high-handed, or oppres-
sive”, Saunders J.A. concluded that Charter damages should not have 
been awarded for the strip search.47 Similarly, as none of the torts 
pleaded against the city were made out, Charter damages should not have 
been awarded for the seizure of Mr. Ward’s car.48 
3.  Supreme Court Decision 
The City of Vancouver and British Columbia appealed the majority’s 
decision upholding the award of Charter damages in the absence of a tort 
or bad faith to the Supreme Court of Canada. Chief Justice McLachlin, 
writing for the entire Court, held that proof of a tort or bad faith was not 
a necessary prerequisite to the award of Charter damages. Instead, she set 
out a four-part test for determining when damages would be an “appro-
priate and just” remedy under section 24(1). 
The first step is to establish that there has been a breach of a substan-
tive Charter right for which an individual remedy under section 24(1) 
needs to be awarded.49 The second step, for which the onus also lies upon 
the claimant, is to establish that damages would “serve a useful function 
or purpose”. They do so if they would promote one or more of the 
purposes of section 24(1): (1) compensating a claimant for a loss 
suffered; (2) vindicating the harm caused to the state and to society by a 
breach of a claimant’s Charter rights; and (3) deterring future breaches of 
Charter rights.50 
The third step of determining whether damages are “appropriate and 
just in the circumstances” requires considering not only the claimant’s 
interests, but also those of society as a whole. Therefore, even if the 
claimant demonstrates that damages are a justifiable remedy because 
they further one of the purposes of section 24(1), the government still has 
an opportunity to show that other considerations render damages inap-
propriate or unjust. The Court left open for future cases the determination 
of a complete catalogue of countervailing factors but did give two 
                                                                                                             
47  Id., at paras. 82 and 89-91. 
48  Id., at para. 96. 
49  Ward (S.C.C.), supra, note 7, at para. 23. 
50  Id., at paras. 24-31. 
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examples.51 The first was the existence of an alternative adequate remedy 
such as an award of tort damages or a declaration of a Charter breach.52 
The second countervailing factor the Court discussed is the concern 
for effective governance. One example where effective governance 
generally renders damages inappropriate is when government agents 
enforce a law or policy that is later struck down as unconstitutional. The 
Court reaffirmed the Mackin principle that damages should not be 
awarded in such a case absent a showing of bad faith but found that the 
principle did not apply to the facts of Mr. Ward’s case.53 The Court went 
on to suggest that other situations might require heightened standards of 
fault when the state establishes that section 24(1) damages raise governance 
concerns but left the development of those standards for future cases.54 
The final step is to determine the appropriate quantum of damages. 
Where the objective of compensation is engaged, Charter damages, like 
tort damages, are intended to restore the claimant to the position he or 
she would have been in had the breach not engaged. Both pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary damages are compensable under the Charter although, by 
analogy with tort damages, non-pecuniary damages are generally fixed at 
a modest conventional rate.55 Damages intended to vindicate Charter 
rights or deter future breaches will principally be determined by the 
seriousness of the breach and must be fair to both the claimant and the 
State. Although Charter damages may have a somewhat punitive effect 
on the government, pure exemplary or punitive damages will only rarely 
be awarded.56 
On the facts of the Ward case, the Court agreed that the strip search 
of Mr. Ward constituted a breach of his section 8 rights.57 It found that 
his injury was serious as strip searches are inherently humiliating and 
degrading and that the correctional officers’ conduct was serious as they 
ignored “the settled law that routine strip searches are inappropriate 
when the individual is being held for a short time in police cells, is not 
mingling with the general prison population, and where the police have 
no legitimate concerns that the individual is concealing weapons that 
                                                                                                             
51  Id., at paras. 32-33. 
52  Id., at paras. 34-37. 
53  Id., at paras. 38-41. 
54  Id., at paras. 42-43. 
55  Id., at paras. 46-51. 
56  Id., at paras. 52-57. 
57  Id., at para. 62. 
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could be used to harm themselves or others.”58 Damages therefore were 
required to compensate Mr. Ward, vindicate the breach of his rights and 
deter future breaches.59 British Columbia did not establish countervailing 
factors — a declaration would not satisfy the need to compensate  
Mr. Ward and no good governance considerations were demonstrated.60 
Finally, the Court concluded that Tysoe J.’s award of $5,000 in damages 
was reasonable.61 The Court, however, overturned the award of $100 in 
damages for the seizure of Mr. Ward’s car. Compensation was not 
engaged as Mr. Ward did not suffer any injury as a result of the seizure.  
A declaration was adequate to vindicate the uncontested breach of  
Mr. Ward’s section 8 rights and to deter future breaches.62 
IV. THE PRINCIPLES OF TORT LIABILITY 
In order to appreciate what was at stake in Ward and to understand 
the significance of the Court’s decision, it is necessary to first consider 
the principles of liability developed over the past 600 years in the 
common law tort system. The common law gradually developed care-
fully balanced standards of fault to determine when a defendant who 
causes harm to another should be held legally liable to compensate the 
plaintiff for that harm. With a few narrow exceptions, mere causation has 
not been sufficient to impose liability. Instead, the defendant must have 
intended to carry out a tortious act or at least have been negligent in so 
doing. When tort liability was extended to the Crown for the actions of 
its servants and agents, it was made clear that the Crown would only be 
liable if those servants and agents could have been found liable for a tort 
— thus a showing of the requisite level of fault was required to sue the 
Crown as well.63 
Ontario, which intervened in Ward at the Supreme Court, took the 
position that unless there are clearly articulated policy reasons to  
depart from the fault requirements which the common law has devel-
oped in particular circumstances, a claim for Charter damages should 
require at least the same level of fault as a private law tort claim in 
                                                                                                             
58  Id., at para. 65. 
59  Id., at paras. 64-66. 
60  Id., at paras. 67-69. 
61 Id., at paras. 70-73. 
62  Id., at paras. 74-78. 
63  See, e.g., Proceedings Against the Crown Act, supra, s. 5(2) and (4). 
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those circumstances.64 Otherwise, Charter damages run the risk of 
subsuming the entire field of tort law when a governmental actor is the 
defendant. Such a result, Ontario argued, would run against the Supreme 
Court’s recent jurisprudence which has carefully delimited the scope of 
governmental tort liability and has often required a higher, not a lower, 
level of fault before a claim could be made out against a governmental 
defendant. The constitutional requirement of an “appropriate and just” 
remedy for Charter breaches can and should be read harmoniously with the 
principles of common law tort liability which have been developed with 
similar rights and policy interests in mind. 
The tort system as it has developed in most common law jurisdic-
tions is premised on the principle that causation alone is not a basis for 
liability. Only where a defendant is at fault should there be liability. 
Depending on the tort alleged, the level of fault required is usually 
negligence or an intention to commit the tortious conduct.65  
The courts refined and expanded the tort of negligence over several 
centuries. They were careful, however, not to extend it to all situations in 
which a defendant causes harm to another. In 1932, Lord Atkin famously 
held that “in order to support an action for damages for negligence the 
complainant has to show that he has been injured by the breach of a duty 
owed to him in the circumstances by the defendant to take reasonable 
care to avoid such injury.”66 
In 1978, the House of Lords articulated a two-stage test for determin-
ing when such a duty of care was owed in Anns v. Merton London 
Borough Council.67 The Supreme Court adopted the Anns standard in 
Kamloops (City) v. Nielsen and has followed it ever since: 
(1)  is there a sufficiently close relationship between the parties (the 
local authority and the person who has suffered the damage) so 
                                                                                                             
64  This is not to suggest that claims for Charter damages should be limited to those common 
law causes of action that existed before the Charter, only that “fault” should continue to be the test 
for liability. For example, while there was no common law right to be free from discrimination and 
no tort of wrongful discrimination, s. 24(1) of the Charter may authorize the Court to award damages 
for government operational conduct that infringes s. 15 of the Charter where the appropriate level of 
fault has been established. 
65  The history of this development has been extensively reviewed in legal texts. See for 
example: J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4th ed. (London: Butterworths, 
2002), at 60-64 and 402-11 [hereinafter “Baker”]. 
66  Id., at 411-21; M’Alister (or Donoghue) v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562, at 579 (H.L.). 
67  [1978] A.C. 728 (H.L.). 
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that, in the reasonable contemplation of the authority, carelessness 
on its part might cause damage to that person? If so, 
(2)  are there any considerations which ought to negative or limit (a) 
the scope of the duty and (b) the class of persons to whom it is 
owed or (c) the damages to which a breach of it may give rise?68 
In addition to the existence of a duty of care toward the plaintiff, the 
liability of the defendant almost always depends on proof of negligence 
or wrongful intent. Generally, the relevant standard of care is the care a 
reasonable person would take in similar circumstances. As the name 
implies, intentional torts require an even higher level of fault — the 
intention to carry out a certain act or omission.69 
If negligence is alleged, the plaintiff must establish the three ele-
ments of the tort of negligence in order to be entitled to damages: 
(1)  the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care recognized by law; 
(2)  the defendant’s conduct fell below the standard of care expected of 
it; and 
(3)  the defendant’s breach of duty caused (both in fact and in law) the 
damage allegedly suffered by the plaintiff.70 
If an intentional tort is alleged, the plaintiff must establish each of the 
tort’s elements, including the required level of intention.71 
The rare cases in which modern Canadian tort law holds defendants 
liable for non-negligent and unintentional harm fall within two narrow 
categories both of which involve the defendant having voluntarily chosen 
to do something which is known to create an excessive risk of harming 
                                                                                                             
68  Kamloops (City) v. Nielsen, [1984] S.C.J. No. 29, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2, at 8-11 (S.C.C.), 
citing Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, id., at 751-52; Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, [2003] 
S.C.J. No. 74, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263, 2003 SCC 69, at paras. 45-47 and 51 (S.C.C.); Childs v. 
Desormeaux, [2006] S.C.J. No. 18, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, 2006 SCC 18, at paras. 9-12 (S.C.C.); 
Design Services Ltd. v. Canada, [2008] S.C.J. No. 22, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 737, 2008 SCC 22, at paras. 
46-47 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Design Services”]; R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2011] S.C.J. 
No. 42, 2011 SCC 42, at paras. 38-39 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Imperial Tobacco”]. 
69  Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, [2007] S.C.J. No. ¸41, 
[2007] 3 S.C.R. 129, 2007 SCC 41, at paras. 68-73 (S.C.C.); Queen v. Cognos Inc., [1993] S.C.J. 
No. 3, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 87, at 121 (S.C.C.); Lewis N. Klar, Tort Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: Thomson 
Carswell, 2008), at 32-34 [hereinafter “Klar”]. 
70  Although they may be treated within the foregoing broader categories or as separate 
elements, the concepts of reasonable foreseeability, proximity and remoteness are also part of any 
ultimate determination of liability. 
71  Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] S.C.J. No. 76, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537, 2001 SCC 79, at paras. 21-
24 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cooper”]. 
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others. The first category consists of cases falling within the principle in 
Rylands v. Fletcher72 (making a non-natural use of land which involves 
bringing something onto the land known to do mischief if it escapes) 
while the second involves cases where the plaintiff has been harmed by 
the defendant’s dangerous animal (i.e., an animal of a type known to be 
dangerous or an animal that has actually been dangerous in the past).73 
These two categories are historical holdovers which the Canadian courts 
have been unwilling to expand further. 
Outside of these two narrow categories, Canadian tort law has con-
sistently required either negligence or an intent to commit a tortious act 
before an act or omission that causes damage can result in liability. In the 
Ward case, Ontario argued that the carefully balanced fault-based rules 
for determining when harm should result in legal liability which have 
been incrementally developed over the past six centuries should not be 
lightly discarded simply because the harm complained of may also be a 
breach of the plaintiff’s Charter rights. 
V. DEVELOPMENT OF PRINCIPLES OF CHARTER LIABILITY 
The Charter only applies to governments and governmental actors. 
Allowing Charter damages to be awarded without proof of fault would 
therefore impose a lower fault requirement when the defendant is a 
governmental actor subject to the Charter than when the defendant is a 
private actor.  
In developing the principles of liability that apply with regard to par-
ticular Charter claims (claims relating to policy decisions, claims for 
malicious prosecution and claims against the judiciary), the courts in 
cases prior to Ward adopted the tort law fault principles that apply to the 
same causes of action, recognizing that the public policy reasons why a 
given degree of fault is required in tort law apply with equal force to 
Charter-based claims. 
1.  Immunity from Liability for Policy Decisions 
Even where there is sufficient proximity between a government ac-
tion and an individual citizen to create a prima facie duty of care, the 
                                                                                                             
72  (1868), 330 L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (H.L.). 
73  Id., at 339-40; Baker, supra, note 65, at 408 and 411; Klar, supra, note 69, at 619-20.  
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courts have created a broad exception for policy decisions: “It is estab-
lished that government actors are not liable in negligence for policy 
decisions, but only operational decisions. The basis of this immunity is 
that policy is the prerogative of the elected Legislature. It is inappropriate 
for courts to impose liability for the consequence of a particular policy 
decision.”74 Policy decisions are decisions based upon “financial, 
economic, social or political factors or constraints”.75 Making govern-
ments liable for policy decisions risks interfering with effective governance 
by deterring governments from creating new programs: “the Crown is 
not a person and must be free to govern and make true policy decisions 
without becoming subject to tort liability as a result of those decisions.”76 
The courts have applied this principle to claims for damages in tort 
cases and Charter cases, emphasizing fault as an integral element of 
liability: “government policy by itself does not create a legally actionable 
wrong. For that, the law requires specific wrongful acts causally con-
nected to damage suffered.”77 Policy immunity is thus grounded in the 
acknowledgment that liability for damages is neither just nor appropriate 
in the absence of fault: “objective standards are notably lacking when the 
question is not negligence but social wisdom, not due care but political 
practicability, not reasonableness but economic expediency. Tort law 
simply furnishes an inadequate crucible for testing the merits of social, 
political or economic decisions.”78 
One of the policy concerns giving rise to this principle is the poten-
tially vast scale of liability that a government would face if it were liable 
for damages to all persons affected by a policy decision subsequently 
declared to be invalid or constitutionally inadequate. As recognized by 
the Supreme Court in Ward, exposing government to this level of 
financial burden could have the effect of redirecting the expenditure of 
public funds away from the restructuring and development of public 
                                                                                                             
74  Cooper, supra, note 71, at para. 38. 
75  Just v. British Columbia, [1989] S.C.J. No. 121, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228, at 1239-45 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Just”]. 
76  Cooper, supra, note 71; Just, id.; Brown v. British Columbia (Minister of Transportation 
and Highways), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 420, at 432-37 and 441 (S.C.C.); Edwards v. Law Society of Upper 
Canada, [2001] S.C.J. No. 77, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 562, 2001 SCC 80, at paras. 14 and 19 (S.C.C.); 
Mackin, supra, note 39, at para. 79; Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v. Greater Winnipeg (Metropolitan 
Corporation), [1970] S.C.J. No. 102, [1971] S.C.R. 957, at 969 (S.C.C.). 
77  Blackwater v. Plint, [2005] S.C.J. No. 59, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 3, 2005 SCC 58, at para. 9 
(S.C.C.). 
78  Just, supra, note 75, at 1240, citing Blessing v. United States, 447 F.Supp. 1160, at 1170 
(E.D. Penn. 1978). 
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programs and institutions toward private individual redress for past acts 
of government.79 It would expose government to “liability in an indeter-
minate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class”.80 As 
Hogg and Monahan state: 
If a decision at the planning level was made in breach of procedural 
requirements, or in bad faith, or for an improper purpose, such a 
decision would be held to be invalid by a Court. But it does not follow 
that damages should be available to a person injured by the decision. 
An award of damages would involve the court moving beyond the 
infirmity of the actual decision and deciding what the “correct” 
decision should have been. As well, an award of damages at the 
planning level would often expose the public authority to a multiplicity 
of lawsuits and intolerable financial burdens. These seem to be the 
reasons why no common law duty of care arises at the planning level: 
even an invalid decision at the planning level does not provide a cause 
of action in negligence.81 
Another reason for restricting the availability of compensatory dam-
ages for invalid government action is the impossibility of accurately 
quantifying such damages. This is because assessing the loss attributable 
to government action subsequently declared to be constitutionally 
inadequate involves speculation as to what the government would have 
done had it known that it could not proceed in the way it did. The 
Supreme Court has recognized that it is not the function of the courts to 
make ad hoc policy choices from a variety of constitutionally valid 
options.82  
The Courts have affirmed that governmental immunity from liability 
for policy decisions applies regardless of whether the challenge to the 
policy is based on tort or the Charter and have thus established a general 
principle that declaratory relief should not be combined with pecuniary 
damages in Charter claims. Where a government policy decision is at 
                                                                                                             
79  Ward (S.C.C.), supra, note 7, at para. 53. 
80  Fullowka v. Pinkerton’s of Canada Ltd., [2010] S.C.J. No. 5, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 132, 2010 
SCC 5, at para. 70 (S.C.C.), quoting Cardozo C.J.C. in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, at 
444 (N.Y. 1931); Imperial Tobacco, supra, note 68, at paras. 97-101. 
81  Hogg & Monahan, supra, note 6, at 165; see also Gosselin v. Québec, supra, note 5, at 
para. 296, Bastarache J. dissenting; Design Services, supra, note 68, at paras. 59-66; Wynberg, 
supra, note 40, at paras. 196-201. 
82  Schachter, supra, note 9, at 707 and 726; Hogg & Monahan, id., at 165; M. v. H., [1999] 
S.C.J. No. 23, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 142 (S.C.C.); Gosselin v. Quebec, id., at paras. 291, 295 
and 298, Bastarache J. dissenting; Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. 
No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624, at paras. 95-96 (S.C.C.). 
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issue, the Courts have confirmed that “absent conduct that is clearly 
wrong, in bad faith or an abuse of power, the courts will not award 
damages …”.83 The Court applies the same legal principles of liability to 
both tort and Charter claims because the public policy reasons for these 
principles apply regardless of how the claim is pleaded. The fact that a 
claim in damages arises from an alleged rights violation: 
… does not oust those fundamental rules which serve to safeguard the 
free and effective discharge of the legislative function. … By analogy, 
in the law of Crown liability, if upon judicial review an administrative 
decision is found to be unlawful, it does not necessarily follow that 
there is a fault giving rise to recourse in civil liability [citations 
omitted].84 
2.  Malicious Prosecution 
In certain cases, public policy has led the courts to require a standard 
of fault considerably higher than mere negligence before a plaintiff can 
bring a private law action against a state actor. For example, in the tort of 
malicious prosecution, the courts have, “in light of the unique role played 
by Crown prosecutors in our modern system of public prosecution”, 
concluded that “inexperience, incompetence, negligence, or even gross 
negligence” are insufficient to impose liability on a Crown prosecutor.85 
A Crown prosecutor can only be held liable for being malicious which 
“requires a plaintiff to prove that the prosecutor wilfully perverted or 
abused the office of the Attorney General or the process of criminal 
justice”.86 The same standard applies regardless of whether the claim is 
pleaded as the tort of malicious prosecution or as a claim that the 
prosecution infringed the plaintiff’s section 7 rights as the Courts have 
recognized that the same public policy concerns apply to both the tort 
and the Charter claim. To require a lower standard of fault for the Charter 
                                                                                                             
83  Mackin, supra, note 39, at para. 78 
84  Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Commu-
nauté urbaine de Montréal), [2004] S.C.J. No. 25, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 789, at paras. 19 and 22-23 
(S.C.C.) (citations omitted); Schachter, supra, note 9, at 720; Mackin, id., at paras. 78-83; Wynberg, 
supra, note 40, at paras. 191-202; R. v. Demers, [2004] S.C.J. No. 43, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 489, 2004 
SCC 46, at para. 62 (S.C.C.). 
85  Miazga, supra, note 8, at paras. 4 and 80; See also Osborne v. Ontario (Attorney Gener-
al), [1996] O.J. No. 2678, at para. 14 (Ont. C.J.), affd [1998] O.J. No. 4457, at para. 2 (Ont. C.A.). 
86  Miazga, id., at para. 80 (emphasis in original). 
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claim would undermine the policy that requires a heightened degree of 
fault for the tort.87 
In Nelles,88 the majority held that prosecutorial immunity “ultimately 
boils down to a question of policy” and emphasized the need “to ensure 
that the Attorney General and Crown Attorneys will not be hindered in 
the proper execution of their important public duties” in determining the 
appropriate standard for liability.89 In her dissenting reasons, Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé cited a passage from American Justice Learned Hand, 
warning that imposing liability on public officials whose mistakes caused 
someone harm would: 
… dampen the ardour of all but the most resolute, or the most 
irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties. Again and 
again the public interest calls for action which may turn out to be 
founded on a mistake, in the face of which an official may later find 
himself hard put to it to satisfy a jury of his good faith. There must 
indeed be means of punishing public officers who have been truant to 
their duties; but that is quite another matter from exposing such as 
have been honestly mistaken to suit by anyone who has suffered from 
their errors.90 
In Miazga, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that “the public good is 
clearly served by the maintenance of a sphere of unfettered discretion 
within which Crown attorneys can properly pursue their professional 
goals.”91 Justice Charron, writing for a unanimous Court, spoke of the 
need to protect prosecutorial independence:  
Its fundamental importance lies, not in protecting the interests of 
individual Crown attorneys, but in advancing the public interest by 
enabling prosecutors to make discretionary decisions in fulfilment of 
their professional obligations without fear of judicial or political 
interference, thus fulfilling their quasi-judicial role as “ministers of 
justice” [citations omitted]. In R. v. Power, [citations omitted], 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. acknowledged the importance of limiting judicial 
oversight of Crown decisions in furtherance of the public interest: 
                                                                                                             
87  Nelles v. Ontario, [1989] S.C.J. No. 86, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Nelles”].  
88  Id. 
89  Id., at 199. 
90  Id., at 222, citing Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, at 581 (2d Cir. 1949). 
91  Miazga, supra, note 8, at para. 47. 
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[T]he Attorney General is a member of the executive and as 
such reflects, through his or her prosecutorial function, the 
interest of the community to see that justice is properly done. 
The Attorney General’s role in this regard is not only to protect 
the public, but also to honour and express the community’s 
sense of justice. Accordingly, courts should be careful before 
they attempt to “second-guess” the prosecutor’s motives when 
he or she makes a decision.92 
Justice Charron pointed out that “the ‘inherent difficulty’ in proving 
a case of malicious prosecution was an intentional choice by the 
Court.”93 The Court in Ward recognized that the availability of Charter 
damages should not undermine the “careful balancing” the Court 
“established in Nelles and Proulx between the right of individual citizens 
… and the public interest.”94 Otherwise, the high threshold for success in 
a malicious prosecution action could be avoided by framing it as a 
Charter claim. 
In Nelles, Lamer J. made it clear that a claim for malicious prosecution 
is, and should be, difficult to maintain and that if it could be established 
the same facts could well support claims for a Charter breach, just as 
the facts in the Doe case (supra) established a claim for negligence and 
supported a corresponding claim for a Charter breach. To suggest that 
where, in an action for malicious prosecution the facts did not support 
the claim, a plea of breach of Charter Rights based upon the same facts 
would act as a sort of fall-back position, would, in my view, render the 
tort of malicious prosecution meaningless and deny the defendants the 
protection implicit in the very high standards established by the Court 
in Nelles.95 
3.  Judicial Immunity 
In other cases, even a heightened fault requirement is insufficient to 
protect public policy interests and complete immunity is required. For 
example, members of the judiciary enjoy complete immunity from  
a claim of damages in relation to the performance of their judicial 
                                                                                                             
92  Id. (emphasis in original). 
93  Id., at para. 52. 
94  Id.; Ward (S.C.C.), supra, note 7, at para. 43. 
95  Oniel v. Toronto (Metropolitan) Police Force, [1998] O.J. No. 3840, at para. 51 (Ont. 
Gen. Div.), revd on other grounds [2001] O.J. No. 90, 195 D.L.R. (4th) 59 (Ont. C.A.). 
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functions. The courts at common law have understood judicial independ-
ence to be the cornerstone of an impartial judiciary, and it is this policy 
concern that has informed the preservation of judicial immunity:  
[T]he most serious consequence of permitting judges to be sued for 
their decisions is that judicial independence would be severely 
compromised. If judges recognized that they could be brought to 
account for their decisions, their decisions might not be based on a 
dispassionate appreciation of the facts and law related to the dispute. 
Rather, they might be tempered by thoughts of which party would be 
more likely to bring an action if they were disappointed by the result, or 
by thoughts of whether a ground-breaking but just approach to a 
difficult legal problem might be later impugned in an action for 
damages against that judge, all of which would be raised by the mere 
threat of litigation. In Lord Denning’s words, a judge would “turn the 
pages of his books with trembling fingers, asking himself: ‘If I do this, 
shall I be liable in damages?’”96 
The public policy interest that gives rise to the need for judges to be 
immune from damages in relation to the performance of their judicial 
functions applies regardless of whether the cause of action is pleaded as a 
tort or as a violation of the Charter. In fact, the Charter provides explicit 
support for this “policy” interest in judicial independence, which is itself 
entrenched as a Charter right: 
Far from being inconsistent with the Constitution, the immunity rule 
has, for several centuries, been considered an essential ingredient of the 
constitutional principle of judicial independence. That principle, 
inherited from the United Kingdom Constitution, was reflected in the 
preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867, and it has been enshrined in the 
Charter in the guarantee, under s. 11(d), of “a hearing before an 
independent and impartial tribunal.” … The immunity rule, having as 
its “raison d’être” the preservation of this important constitutional 
principle, can hardly be characterized as inconsistent with the 
Constitution.97 
                                                                                                             
96  Taylor v. Canada (Attorney General), [2000] F.C.J. No. 268, [2000] 3 F.C.R. 298, at 
para. 28 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 213 (S.C.C.); Morier v. Rivard, 
[1985] S.C.J. No. 81, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 716, at 739 (S.C.C.); Sirros v. Moore, [1975] 1 Q.B. 118, at 
136 (C.A.). 
97  Royer v. Mignault, [1989] J.Q. no 407, 50 D.L.R. (4th) 345, at 359 (Que. C.A.), leave to 
appeal refused [1988] 1 S.C.R. xiii (emphasis added). See, e.g., Atty-Gen. v. Chapman, [2011] 
NZSC 110, where the majority of the New Zealand Supreme Court recently held that judicial 
immunity and the separation of powers precluded an award of damages against either the individual 
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If judicial immunity did not apply to claims for damages under the 
Charter, judges might well find themselves liable to Charter damages, 
particularly in criminal cases where trial judges must navigate the 
complex and evolving jurisprudence relating to the legal rights and 
protections guaranteed to accused persons by sections 7 to 14 of the 
Charter. While incorrect judicial decisions may result in an infringement 
of the accused’s Charter rights, the consistent remedy for such an error 
has been a successful appeal, not the elimination of the doctrine of 
judicial immunity or an entitlement to sue a judge for damages under 
section 24(1) of the Charter.  
VI. THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF WARD IN CLAIMS  
AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT 
In order to understand the practical significance of the Ward decision, 
we must first examine why plaintiffs seeking damages against government 
often plead that the same allegations give rise to causes of action both in 
tort and under the Charter. Ward is only significant to the extent that the 
Charter claim is somehow different than the tort claim arising from the 
same set of facts. There appear to be four reasons for this strategy, only 
one of which remains an arguable proposition after Ward. 
The first rationale for the practice of pleading both a tort and a Char-
ter infringement is the hope that, if the plaintiff cannot prove all of the 
elements of the tort claim, some of these elements (for example, negli-
gence) will not be necessary to obtain damages under the Charter. On its 
face, this seems to be the result in Ward, since the trial judge dismissed 
the plaintiff’s negligence claim and the Supreme Court, without disturb-
ing the trial judge’s finding on negligence, still awarded damages. Justice 
Tysoe concluded that Mr. Ward had not proven two of the three elements 
of the tort of negligence: “First, any duty owed by the City of Vancouver 
and the Provincial Government was a duty owed to the general public 
and was not a private law duty owed to Mr. Ward for the purposes of the 
tort of negligence … Second, there was no evidence on the applicable 
standard of care.”98 Mr. Ward did not appeal these findings and the 
Supreme Court did not address them directly.  
                                                                                                             
judge or the Crown where a judge’s actions had resulted in a breach of the claimant’s rights under 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights.  
98  Ward (B.C.S.C.), supra, note 11, at para. 96. 
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On closer examination, however, it is clear that, while the Supreme 
Court does not conclude that the principles of tort liability will always be 
applied to section 24(1) Charter claims, it is not prepared to abandon 
these principles altogether. This ambivalence is most obvious at para-
graph 43 of the decision, which states: 
When appropriate, private law thresholds and defences may offer 
guidance in determining whether s. 24(1) damages would be 
“appropriate and just”. While the threshold for liability under the 
Charter must be distinct and autonomous from that developed under 
private law, the existing causes of action against state actors embody a 
certain amount of “practical wisdom” concerning the type of situation 
in which it is or is not appropriate to make an award of damages against 
the state.99  
Indeed, it appears that the Supreme Court did not agree with the find-
ings of the trial judge with regard to either the duty of care or the 
standard of care as the Supreme Court’s award of damages was premised 
on an implied conclusion that there was both a private law duty of care 
and conduct on the part of the jail guards that fell below the reasonable 
standard of care. On the first point (the existence of a private law duty of 
care), the trial judge’s decision was based on case law that was overruled 
by the Supreme Court just a few months after his decision. In Hill v. 
Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board,100 the Supreme 
Court held that investigating police officers do owe a private law duty  
of care to suspects. Their conduct during an investigation should be  
measured against the standard of how a reasonable officer in like 
circumstances would have acted. Police officers may be accountable for 
harm resulting to a suspect if they fail to meet this standard. The majority 
described the standard of care as follows: 
I conclude that the appropriate standard of care is the overarching 
standard of a reasonable police officer in similar circumstances. This 
standard should be applied in a manner that gives due recognition to the 
discretion inherent in police investigation. Like other professionals, 
police officers are entitled to exercise their discretion as they see fit, 
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provided that they stay within the bounds of reasonableness. The 
standard of care is not breached because a police officer exercises his 
or her discretion in a manner other than that deemed optimal by the 
reviewing court. A number of choices may be open to a police officer 
investigating a crime, all of which may fall within the range of 
reasonableness. So long as discretion is exercised within this range, the 
standard of care is not breached. The standard is not perfection, or even 
the optimum, judged from the vantage of hindsight. It is that of a 
reasonable officer, judged in the circumstances prevailing at the time 
the decision was made — circumstances that may include urgency and 
deficiencies of information. The law of negligence does not require 
perfection of professionals; nor does it guarantee desired results … 
Rather, it accepts that police officers, like other professionals, may 
make minor errors or errors in judgment which cause unfortunate 
results, without breaching the standard of care. The law distinguishes 
between unreasonable mistakes breaching the standard of care and 
mere “errors in judgment” which any reasonable professional might 
have made and therefore, which do not breach the standard of care.101 
While the trial judge in Ward found no evidence had been led regard-
ing the applicable standard of care, the Supreme Court decision clearly 
indicates that the Supreme Court concluded that the conduct of the 
corrections officers did fall below the appropriate standard of care. The 
Court stated: 
The corrections officers’ conduct which caused the breach of Mr. 
Ward’s Charter rights was also serious. Minimum sensitivity to 
Charter concerns within the context of the particular situation would 
have shown the search to be unnecessary and violative. Mr. Ward did 
not commit a serious offence, he was not charged with an offence 
associated with evidence being hidden on the body, no weapons were 
involved and he was not known to be violent or to carry weapons. Mr. 
Ward did not pose a risk of harm to himself or others, nor was there 
any suggestion that any of the officers believed that he did. In these 
circumstances, a reasonable person would understand that the 
indignity resulting from the search was disproportionate to any benefit 
which the search could have provided. In addition, without asking 
officers to be conversant with the details of court rulings, it is not too 
much to expect that police would be familiar with the settled law that 
routine strip searches are inappropriate where the individual is being 
held for a short time in police cells, is not mingling with the general 
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prison population, and where the police have no legitimate concerns 
that the individual is concealing weapons that could be used to harm 
themselves or others.102 
The italicized words in this paragraph look very much like the stan-
dard of care analysis set out in the Hill case, indicating that the Supreme 
Court would have likely come to the same conclusion had the issue 
before it been one of damages for negligence rather than under the 
Charter. These were important factors in the Court’s decision, and it is, in 
our view, unlikely that Charter damages would have been awarded had 
the Court not found that the conduct of the corrections officers was 
serious and fell below that of a “reasonable person” and, more specifi-
cally, below that of a reasonable corrections officer who would be 
“familiar with the settled law”.  
In addition, the Court in Ward reaffirmed its recent decision in Mi-
azga that held that a claim of malicious prosecution against a Crown 
Attorney requires proof of malice regardless of whether the claim is 
brought in tort or under the Charter.103 Accordingly, Ward does not 
support the proposition that claims for damages under section 24(1) of 
the Charter will be easier to prove than the equivalent tort claims arising 
from the same conduct.  
The second reason for pleading both a tort and a Charter infringe-
ment is an effort to circumvent the government’s qualified immunity 
from negligence claims for policy decisions.104 Plaintiffs hoped that by 
adding a Charter claim to their allegation of negligence, the courts would 
consider an award of damages in circumstances where the tort claim 
would be dismissed. This strategy is particularly prevalent in proposed 
class actions which are funded by contingency fees based on a percent-
age of the damages recovered. While there has been an increase in the 
number of class actions brought against the government in the past few 
years, many of these proposed actions have foundered on the well-
established principle that government policy decisions are, in the absence 
of bad faith or an abuse of power, immune from tort liability. Courts have 
struck out several proposed class actions seeking damages for govern-
ment policy decisions regarding funding for, for example, disabled 
                                                                                                             
102  Ward (S.C.C.), supra, note 7, at para. 65 (emphasis added). 
103  See notes 90-93, supra. 
104  See 406-409, supra. 
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children and health care.105 While the Crown has qualified immunity 
from tort liability for policy decisions, such policy decisions are not 
immune from Charter challenges. If plaintiffs could combine a Charter 
challenge to government policy with a claim for damages, perhaps a 
viable class action proceeding would be created. 
As indicated above, the Supreme Court of Canada has consistently 
affirmed that the principle of qualified immunity for policy decisions 
applies in the Charter context. While the validity of government policy 
decisions are subject to judicial review under the Charter, the Court has 
indicated that if the policy is found to infringe the Charter, the appropri-
ate remedy is a declaration under section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 
and not an individual remedy like damages under section 24(1) of the 
Charter.106 This principle was confirmed again in the Ward case, although 
the Court held that it did not apply to Mr. Ward’s claim because the 
impugned conduct was not a “policy” or taken under a statute or policy 
that was subsequently declared invalid.107 Accordingly, Ward did not 
expand the scope for claiming damages in challenges to government 
policy decisions or state conduct pursuant to a valid statute which is later 
determined to be invalid and the qualified immunity applies regardless of 
whether the claim is pleaded as negligence or a Charter violation.  
The third reason for pleading both a tort and a Charter infringement 
is the hope that damages might be multiplied by the addition of another 
cause of action. Plaintiffs often claim damages for the tort claim and 
additional damages for the alleged Charter breach. The Court in Ward 
makes clear that double recovery will not be available in these cases: 
                                                                                                             
105  Laroza Estate v. Ontario, [2009] O.J. No. 1820, 95 O.R. (3d) 764 (Ont. C.A.); Abarquez 
v. Ontario, [2009] O.J. No. 1814, 95 O.R. (3d) 414 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2009] 
S.C.C.A. No. 297 (S.C.C.); Williams v. Canada (Attorney General), [2009] O.J. No. 1819, 95 O.R. 
(3d) 401 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 298 (S.C.C.); Eliopoulos v. 
Ontario (Minister of Health and Long-Term Care), [2006] O.J. No. 4400, 82 O.R. (3d) 321 (Ont. 
C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 514 (S.C.C.); L. (A.) v. Ontario (Minister of 
Community and Social Services), [2006] O.J. No. 4673 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2007] 
S.C.C.A. No. 36 (S.C.C.); Sagharian (Litigation guardian of) v. Ontario (Minister of Education), 
[2008] O.J. No. 2009, 172 C.R.R. (2d) 105 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 
350 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sagharian”]; Cilinger c. Quebec (Procureur général), [2004] J.Q. no 
11627 (Que. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2004] C.S.C.R. No. 582 (S.C.C.). 
106  Schachter, supra, note 9, at para. 102; Guimond v. Québec (Attorney General), [1996] 
S.C.J. No. 91, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 347 (S.C.C.); Mackin, supra, note 39; Wynberg, supra, note 40; 
Sagharian, id. 
107  Ward (S.C.C.), supra, note 7, at paras. 38-41. 
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“[A] concurrent action in tort, or other private law claim, bars s. 24(1) 
damages if the result would be double compensation.”108 
The final reason for pleading both tort and Charter infringements 
was an attempt to avoid the effect of limitation periods or notice re-
quirements. Prior to the reform of limitation periods under the Limita-
tions Act, 2002,109 tort actions against the Crown were subject to a six-
month limitation period under the Public Authorities Protection Act.110 
While the validity of the six-month limitation period was upheld in its 
application to tort claims, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Prete v. 
Ontario111 concluded that it was invalid in its application to Charter 
claims.112 Indeed, the Court appeared to go further and hold that no 
limitation period could apply to claims brought under section 24(1) of 
the Charter. Accordingly, while a tort action for malicious prosecution 
had to be commenced within the six-month period, a claim against the 
same conduct based on section 7 of the Charter was apparently not 
subject to any limitation period but only to the doctrine of laches.  
While other courts in Canada accepted the principle that the govern-
ment should not be permitted to immunize itself against Charter damages 
claims by imposing special shorter limitation periods that were uniquely 
favourable to the government, they held that statutory limitation periods 
of general application did apply to claims for damages pursuant to 
section 24(1) of the Charter.113 In Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v. New 
Brunswick (Finance),114 the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that 
general limitation periods are applicable to restitutionary claims based on 
the return of moneys collected under constitutionally invalid legislation 
                                                                                                             
108  Id., at para. 36. See also para. 59: “It may be useful to consider the tort claim first, since 
if it meets the objects of Charter damages, recourse to s. 24(1) will be unnecessary.” 
109  S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sch. B, s. 25. 
110  R.S.O. 1990, c. P.38, s. 7. 
111  [1993] O.J. No. 2794, 110 D.L.R. (4th) 94 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Prete”]. 
112  See also Ayangma v. Prince Edward Island Eastern School Board, [2000] P.E.I.J. No. 50, 
187 D.L.R. (4th) 304, at para. 10 (P.E.I.C.A.). 
113  McGillivary v. New Brunswick, [1994] N.B.J. No. 34, 111 D.L.R. (4th) 483 (N.B.C.A.); 
Nagy v. Phillips, [1996] A.J. No. 709, 137 D.L.R. (4th) 715 (Alta. C.A.); Gauthier v. Lambert, 
[1988] J.Q. no 56 (Que. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1988] C.S.C.R. No. 138 (S.C.C.); St-Onge v. 
Canada, [2000] F.C.J. No. 1523 (F.C.A.); Pearson v. Canada, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1175 (F.C.T.D.), 
affd [2007] F.C.J. No. 1598 (F.C.A.) (although the limitations issue was not dealt with by the 
F.C.A.); Zadworny v. Manitoba (Attorney General), [2007] M.J. No. 413, at paras. 11-13 (Man. 
C.A.); Garry v. Canada, [2007] A.J. No. 761, at para. 21 (Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2007] 
S.C.C.A. No. 546 (S.C.C.); Hamm v. Canada, [2007] F.C.J. No. 801, at paras. 55 and 63 (F.C.T.D.), 
affd [2008] F.C.J. No. 609 (F.C.A.). 
114  [2007] S.C.J. No. 1, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2007 SCC 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kingstreet”]. 
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and that the application of the limitation period did not constitute an 
impermissible attempt by government to immunize itself.115  
In Ravndahl v. Saskatchewan,116 the Supreme Court extended this 
principle to an action for damages under section 24(1) of the Charter. The 
Court stated: 
The argument that The Limitation of Actions Act does not apply to 
personal claims was abandoned before us, counsel for the appellant 
conceding that The Limitations of Actions Act applies to such 
claims. This is consistent with this Court’s decision in Kingstreet 
Investments Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Finance), 2007 SCC 1, [2007] 1 
S.C.R. 3, which held that limitation periods apply to claims for 
personal remedies that flow from the striking down of an 
unconstitutional statute.117 
While limitation periods of general application apply to personal 
damage claims made pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter, they do not 
apply to actions for declarations under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 
1982.118 Actions for declarations may be commenced so long as the 
statute is extant. If the statute is repealed its constitutional validity will 
generally be moot regardless of how much time has passed. The issue of 
whether an in rem declaration will have any retroactive effect is a matter 
to be determined by the Court in a manner consistent with the principles 
set out in the Supreme Court’s decision in Hislop119 and may be subject 
                                                                                                             
115  Id., at paras. 13 and 59-61. The issue in Kingstreet related to a taxing statute that was 
found to infringe s. 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 because it was a tax 
disguised as a licence fee. See Eurig, supra, note 1. 
116  [2009] S.C.J. No. 7, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 181, 2009 SCC 7 (S.C.C.). 
117  Id., at para. 17. 
118  Id., at para. 27: It is important to distinguish the appellant’s personal, or in personam, 
remedies, brought by her as an individual, from an in rem remedy flowing from s. 52 that may 
extend a benefit to the appellant and all similarly affected persons. As stated in the factum of the 
intervener the Attorney General of Ontario: 
Where legislation is found to be unconstitutionally underinclusive, the prospective re-
medial option chosen by the court might extend the benefit at issue through severance or 
reading in, or it might suspend the operation of the declaration of invalidity to allow the 
government to determine whether to cancel, modify, or extend the benefit at issue. If the 
unconstitutional underinclusive benefit is extended to include the [appellant’s] Charter 
claiman[t] group, whether through the court’s s. 52(1) declaration or through govern-
ment’s response to the court’s s. 52(1) declaration, the [appellant], like any otherwise 
eligible person [in the claimant group], reaps the benefit of the s. 52(1) declaration, even 
if the claimant does not obtain a personalized remedy from the court. 
119  Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop, [2007] S.C.J. No. 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429, 2007 
SCC 10 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hislop”]. 
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to statutory rules limiting the period for which retroactive payment of 
benefits may be made or refunds collected.120 
Following Ravndahl, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Alexis v. 
Darnley121 acknowledged that Prete’s obiter comments regarding general 
limitation periods could not stand.122 The Court concluded: “In my view, 
therefore, the Supreme Court’s reasons clearly signal that limitation 
periods of general application will apply to claims made under section 
24(1) of the Charter that are, ‘brought as an individual for personal 
remedy.’”123  
Accordingly, since most short limitation periods applicable only to 
the government, including the six-month limitation period in the Public 
Authorities Protection Act, were repealed in 2002 and replaced with the 
general two-year limitation period in the Limitations Act, 2002, the 
decision in Prete has now been virtually eclipsed, and claims for section 
24(1) damages brought in Ontario will be subject to the same limitation 
period as tort claims arising for the same conduct.  
VII. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DAMAGES AND DECLARATIONS 
This last point — the distinction between monetary payments result-
ing from declarations of invalidity and damages — often causes some 
analytical confusion and merits further discussion. It is sometimes 
suggested that monetary payments resulting from declarations of invalid-
ity are the equivalent of damages, and are awarded without a showing of 
fault. Yet while money is money, and the monetary payments resulting 
from declarations of invalidity may far exceed any money ordered in 
damages, such monetary payments are analytically distinct from money 
paid as damages.  
Damages are amounts calculated and awarded by a court to compen-
sate an individual for an injury or other wrong.124 A claim for damages is 
a claim for a personal remedy and only the plaintiffs to the action are 
entitled to that remedy. While declarations of invalidity may result in the 
                                                                                                             
120  Kingstreet, supra, note 114, at paras. 13 and 59-61. 
121  [2009] O.J. No. 5170, 100 O.R. (3d) 232 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2010] 
S.C.C.A. No. 44 (S.C.C.). 
122  Id., at paras. 14-17. 
123  Id., at para. 17. See also Baltrusaitis v. Ontario, [2011] O.J. No. 351, 2011 ONSC 532, at 
para. 52 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Baltrusaitis”]. 
124  Hogg & Monahan, supra, note 6, at 25. 
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return of money (when the statutory authorization to collect a tax or fee 
is declared invalid) or result in the retroactive or prospective payment of 
money (when the declaration expands the statutory entitlement or 
eligibility to receive a government payment or other benefit), the amount 
of money paid or refunded is based on the operation of the statute as it 
reads subsequent to the declaration. The commencement or duration of 
the payment will depend on whether the declaration is suspended or 
given retroactive effect, but the quantum is based on the statute. 
A declaration that a statutory provision is invalid is an in rem remedy 
and not a personal remedy. While the effect of such a declaration of 
invalidity may be that the plaintiff (and all others subject to the same 
law) gains a statutory entitlement to a particular benefit, this is not a 
personal remedy, but is the consequence of a change in the legislation 
affected by the declaration. Where a declaration is granted which, for 
example, extends a statutory benefit, the natural operation of the law as 
declared renders it unnecessary and redundant to also order a personal 
remedy.125 
Another important difference between damages and a declaration is 
that the damage order is determinative of the amount of money that the 
plaintiff will receive, whereas the monetary value of a declaration is 
almost always subject to subsequent legislative amendments. If, for 
example, the Court awards a plaintiff $100,000 in damages under section 
24(1) of the Charter, there may be no unilateral action that the govern-
ment can take to reduce or eliminate that entitlement. Legislation 
purporting to nullify or reduce a section 24(1) damages award, for 
example, would likely infringe the Charter.  
Where the Court issues a declaration under section 52 of the Consti-
tution Act, 1982, the precise contours of the declaration will be deter-
mined by the Court using the principles developed in Schachter and 
Hislop, with reference to the nature of the violation and the context of the 
specific legislative provisions under consideration. Where legislation is 
found to be unconstitutionally underinclusive, the prospective remedial 
option chosen by the Court might extend the benefit at issue through 
severance or reading in.126 If the benefit is extended by declaration, the 
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126  The Court might also suspend the operation of the declaration of invalidity to allow the 
government to cancel, modify or extend the benefit at issue. The prospective value of the benefit will 
then depend on the option chosen by the Legislature to comply with the principles set out in the 
Court’s decision.  
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Charter claimant, like any otherwise eligible person, reaps the benefit of 
that declaration. But the declaration is not necessarily the final word, 
because the legislature retains the power to subsequently cancel, modify 
or extend the benefit at issue. The future value of any statutory benefit is 
always subject to the power of the Legislature (or the Executive in the 
case of a regulation) to decrease, increase or eliminate the benefit, so 
long as the changes are themselves consistent with the Charter. The 
courts have no authority to immunize any plaintiff from subsequent 
legislative amendments. 
Under certain circumstances, unconstitutional legislation can even be 
replaced by constitutional legislation, which, if made retroactive, will 
negate any refund that would have otherwise flowed from the declara-
tion. For example, where a statutory fee is declared to be unconstitutional 
on the basis that it is actually a tax, the fee/taxpayer would generally be 
entitled to a refund since the fee/tax was taken without statutory author-
ity.127 The Supreme Court of Canada has, however, confirmed the power 
of the Legislature to impose retroactive taxes to correct any deficiency in 
the previous statute and a properly drafted retroactive tax would enable 
the government to retain the money previously collected.128 
VIII. FORUM AND PROCEDURE 
Just as Ward will likely not lead to substantively different results in 
Charter damage claims than those obtained in tort claims, it also will 
likely not lead to the creation of new procedures for seeking damages 
from the government. The Supreme Court made it clear that the “proce-
dural requirements associated with existing remedies are crafted to 
achieve a proper balance between public and private interests, and the 
underlying policy considerations of these requirements should not be 
negated by recourse to s. 24(1) of the Charter. As stated earlier, s. 24(1) 
operates concurrently with, and does not replace, the general law.”129 
Thus the rules of civil procedure, including, for example, the filing of a 
statement of claim and rules regarding discovery, as well as the notice 
                                                                                                             
127  Kingstreet, supra, note 114, at para. 13. 
128  Id., at paras. 12 and 2; Eurig, supra, note 1, at para. 44. 
129  Ward (S.C.C.), supra, note 7, at para. 43. 
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requirements of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act,130 will continue 
to apply to Charter damage claims. 
Many findings of a Charter breach are made in criminal proceedings, 
most of which are heard in provincial courts. To date, the remedy 
awarded for such a breach has usually been a procedural remedy such as 
the exclusion of evidence or a stay of proceedings. The Ward case 
indicates that where such remedies are available, they will generally 
suffice to vindicate the Charter right, and damages will not be appropri-
ate under the third step of the Ward analysis.131 Assuming that a claim for 
Charter damages is made, however, does Ward authorize criminal courts 
to consider awarding Charter damages under section 24(1)? In Ward, the 
Supreme Court indicated its intention that a claim for damages should 
follow the existing rules of civil procedure and should be commenced in 
the court “which by statute or inherent jurisdiction has the power to 
award damages”.132 Provincial criminal courts “are not so empowered 
and thus do not have the power to award damages under s. 24(1)”.133 
This echoes earlier cases in which the Supreme Court held that criminal 
courts do not have jurisdiction to award Charter damages in a criminal 
proceeding.134 Criminal proceedings are designed to determine whether 
                                                                                                             
130  R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 7(1). A notice is required whether the action is a common law 
action or an action based on breach of Charter rights: Deep v. Park, [2001] O.J. No. 6122 (Ont. 
S.C.J.); R. v. Reisher, [2002] O.J. No. 1793, at para. 7 (Ont. S.C.J.); Singh v. Ontario, [2002] O.J. 
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131  Ward (S.C.C.), supra, note 7, at para. 34: “A functional approach to damages under s. 
24(1) means that if other remedies adequately meet the need for compensation, vindication and/or 
deterrence, a further award of damages under s. 24(1) would serve no function and would not be 
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132  Id., at para. 58. 
133  Id. See, however, R. v. Wetzel, [2011] S.J. No. 8, 2011 SKPC 9, at paras. 73-89 (Sask. 
Prov. Ct.), for a provincial court that decided it could award Charter damages in a criminal case 
where an accused had been arbitrarily detained in breach of s. 9. The Court based its finding on the 
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held that there was no reason to require the accused to bring a separate civil claim for damages, it did 
not fully consider the disadvantages of assessing whether damages are an appropriate remedy in a 
criminal proceeding. 
134  R. v. Mills, [1986] S.C.J. No. 39, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863, at paras. 43, 266 and 293 (S.C.C.), 
and R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc., [2001] S.C.J. No. 79, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 575 at paras. 52, 53 and 57 
(S.C.C.). See also: R. v. Reisher, [2002] O.J. No.1793, at paras. 18-19 (Ont. S.C.J.): 
It is clear from Mills and the case of R. v. Dunedin Construction that courts exercising 
a criminal function are not to mix and match criminal and civil jurisdictions when resolv-
ing Charter issues. This approach, it is said: 
… heeds the structural limits of the criminal trial process by confining the courts’ 
remedial powers to the criminal sphere. 
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an accused is guilty of a crime and accordingly have a higher standard of 
proof and greater procedural protections for the accused (for example, 
the right not to testify). Whether damages are an appropriate remedy for 
a Charter breach is more appropriately determined in civil proceedings 
where the state has the right to test the claimant’s case by disclosure of 
documents, examinations for discovery and the power to compel the 
claimant to answer questions even if they would have incriminated the 
claimant in criminal proceedings.135 Civil courts will therefore likely 
remain the forum for determining whether Charter damages should be 
awarded as a section 24(1) remedy. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
At first glance, Ward seems to have created a parallel system of “tort 
lite” — a means for tort claimants who have somehow been unable to 
prove all aspects of their claim to have another chance under the Charter. 
In practice, however, we do not believe that Ward will result in a radical 
expansion of governmental liability beyond that already provided by the 
law of tort. 
In the vast majority of cases, claimants will likely bring a concurrent 
tort action as well, whether because they want to sue individuals in-
volved directly136 or because they do not want to risk putting all of their 
eggs in one Charter basket. In most of those cases, it will be unnecessary 
to even consider whether Charter damages should be awarded. If the tort 
claim is made out, the principle against double recovery will preclude a 
separate award of Charter damages. And in many of the cases where the 
facts do not show a tort has occurred, they also will not disclose a breach 
of the claimant’s Charter rights that could give rise to a remedy under 
section 24(1). 
Those who hoped that Ward would turn the Charter into a font of 
public law damages will be disappointed by the Court’s analysis. While 
the principles for awarding public law damages against the state may one 
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day diverge from the principles for awarding private law damages 
against state actors, this has not happened yet.  
  
